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1. Introduction  7 
Increasingly, both market-based instruments (MBIs) and the concept of ecosystem services (ESs) have 8 
gained favor in the environmental policy, planning and ecological conservation world (Pirard & 9 
Lapeyre, 2014). ESs are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, which frames the relationship 10 
between humans and the rest of nature (Costanza et al., 2014; MA, 2005). The close linkages between 11 
human well-being and natural resource management has required better policies and instruments to 12 
enable sustainable governance outcomes. Accordingly, MBIs – a generic term referring to a range of 13 
approaches (e.g., cap and trade schemes, payment schemes, and levies) to address environmental 14 
policy issues in an economically efficient way – have attracted much attention (Muradian et al., 2013; 15 
Pirard & Lapeyre, 2014). These instruments attempt to build supply-demand connections and create 16 
incentives to affect actors’ behavior (Boisvert et al., 2013). MBIs mainly support market mechanisms, 17 
such as voluntary transactions between actors, competition for services, and price signals (the EC 18 
Green Paper, European Commission, 2007; Lockie, 2013). Specifically, MBIs internalize the external 19 
costs of an action through taxes, or they create a market for ESs and individual property rights that 20 
favors competition (Dargusch & Griffiths, 2008). By doing so, MBIs seek to solve negative 21 
environmental externalities or even benefit positive externalities, such as inshore overfishing, sewage 22 
discharge into the sea, and utilization of environmentally-friendly tourism products (Engel et al., 2008; 23 
Greiner et al., 2000; Muradian et al., 2010). The main motive underlying MBIs is that they constitute 24 
more flexible responses and cost-effective options, which are superior to traditional regulation for ES 25 
conservation (Bräuer et al., 2006; Davis & Gartside, 2001; Hahn & Stavins, 1992).  26 
MBIs have been gradually adopted to serve the governance of coastal and marine ESs. There are 27 
wetland mitigation banks, tradable development rights of flooding zones, eco-labels of fish products, 28 
and payment for ecosystem services (Binet et al., 2013; Filatova, 2014; Froger et al., 2014; 29 
Ressurreição et al., 2012). Coastal and marine ESs play a critical role in sustaining socio-economic 30 
development in coastal regions. However, there is a challenge for coastal and marine governance 31 
worldwide: managing ES complexity in relation to, for instance, ecological uncertainty, bio-physical 32 
dynamics between land and sea, and stakeholders’ interests across geographical and institutional 33 
scales (Koch et al., 2009). MBIs have been advocated as being desirable to address this challenge 34 
(Davis & Gartside, 2001). Nowadays, they are considered to be the preferred tools for improving 35 
coastal and marine governance in both developed (e.g., the U.S., and Australia) and developing 36 
countries (e.g., Latin American countries and China; Douvere 2008; Greiner, 2014; Womble & Doyle, 37 
2012; Zhao et al., 2015).  38 
Previous studies concerning MBIs have mainly emphasized initiative development in forest 39 
reservation, watershed protection, agriculture, biodiversity, and carbon sequestration (Chobotová, 40 
2013; Hejnowicz et al., 2014; Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013). A strong focus has also been on the 41 
performance evaluation of MBIs by measuring and modeling their benefits and the cost-effectiveness 42 
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of investment (Connor et al., 2008; Crossman et al., 2011; Bryan et al., 2016). Next to these empirical 43 
experiences, theoretical studies have presented conceptualizations, classifications, and potential 44 
governance modes that may strengthen the application of MBIs (Muradian et al., 2010; Pirard & 45 
Lapeyre, 2014). The governance of MBIs for ESs needs to facilitate economic incentives to influence 46 
actors’ behavior and allocate natural resources. This should be in combination with regulations to 47 
draw on different motivations to sustain ESs cost-effectively (Matzdorf et al,, 2013). In other words, 48 
the use of MBIs for ESs has required hybrid governance that combines both market and regulatory 49 
elements (Muradian & Gómez-Baggethun, 2013). However, to date, MBIs for ESs in the coastal and 50 
marine field have received limited attention. In particular, an empirical understanding of the required 51 
governance has been lacking. To improve the implementation of MBIs for ESs, it is critical to gain 52 
insights into how existing coastal and marine governance facilitates MBIs in practice. 53 
The objective of this paper is to gain theoretical and empirical insights into the utilization of MBIs for 54 
governing coastal and marine ESs. For this purpose, this paper develops an analytical framework to 55 
investigate the governance of MBIs from four distinctive aspects; namely price, regulatory support, 56 
coordination, and spatial consideration (e.g., Boisvert et al., 2013; Muradian & Rival, 2012). The 57 
empirical focus is on experience from China. China has experienced a fast-paced economic 58 
development in the past thirty years. Its complex environmental issues and huge pressures on 59 
ecosystems (e.g., air pollution, biodiversity losses, and depleted fisheries) are among the most severe 60 
of any major country (Liu & Diamond, 2005). China’s traditional command-and-control arrangements 61 
have gradually facilitated the evolution of MBIs for ESs to tackle these issues in a more flexible and 62 
effective way. This evolution is visible in China’s national coastal and marine governance. Many 63 
national policies have tended to integrate economic incentives, ES valuation, impact assessment, and 64 
spatial allocation. This makes China an interesting case when discussing how MBIs are implemented 65 
in national policies that focus on coastal and marine ESs, and understanding to what extent a market 66 
environment can be created for ESs. 67 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the theoretical relevance of understanding 68 
MBIs for ESs. It also presents an analytical framework formulated around four distinctive governance 69 
aspects of MBIs to guide further empirical investigation. Section 3 introduces the case of China. The 70 
research strategy is explained in Section 4. Results on the governance of the selected MBIs are shown 71 
in Section 5. Subsequently, merits and shortcomings of Chinese coastal and marine governance are 72 
reflected on regarding their relevant to MBIs. Efforts to improve MBIs’ utilization in general are 73 
emphasized. The final section presents the main conclusions.  74 
2. MBIs for ES governance 75 
2.1 Theoretical relevance of understanding MBIs for ESs  76 
The use of MBIs for ES governance has emerged in recent international discussions and sparked a 77 
broad theoretical debate (Muradian & Gómez-Baggethun, 2013; Tacconi, 2012). Within this debate, it 78 
has been argued that MBIs need to emphasize a typical market feature; namely, the voluntary nature 79 
of the choice for related actors (Engel et al., 2008). MBIs should facilitate freedom of choice for 80 
interactions among related stakeholders (Jack et al., 2008; Tacconi, 2012; Wunder, 2015). This implies 81 
that coastal and marine governance should, for instance, establish negotiation platforms and stimulate 82 
bargaining processes to achieve voluntary agreements on effective allocation of ESs (Filatova, 2014; 83 
Liu & Guo, 2015; Tennent & Lockie, 2013). Reinforcing coordination has also been emphasized in 84 
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terms of the transaction costs for MBIs. Markets for ESs normally involve considerable transaction 85 
costs when aligning interrelated actions, such as contract bargains and performance monitoring (Jack 86 
et al., 2008; Muradian & Rival, 2012). The governance of MBIs seeks to reduce transaction costs by 87 
building up necessary trust, using regulatory power, providing cost assessment, and stimulating 88 
competition (Stavins, 2003; Vatn, 2010). For MBIs to be worthwhile, coastal and marine governance 89 
should keep transaction costs sufficiently low. 90 
Moreover, ES valuation has been perceived as an important basis for MBIs. Commoditizing 91 
ES-related proxies has been promoted and rationalized as a way to integrate ES values into MBIs 92 
(Nelson et al., 2009). Observable and measurable ecosystem properties and regulatory factors have 93 
gained favor in valuation to inform costs and benefits in ES transactions (Jack et al., 2008; Tacconi, 94 
2012). This theoretical discussion implies more instrumental innovations with respect to coastal 95 
spatial allocation through land/sea uses and economic incentives. Last, but not least, MBIs are 96 
envisioned to incorporate the idea of dealing with complex causalities of ES issues (e.g., spill-over 97 
influence, trade-offs and synergies among ESs). MBIs are supposed to reveal cost-effectively causal 98 
information, internalize multiple costs, and allocate benefits that diverge according to spatial range 99 
(Corbera et al., 2009; Lockie, 2013; Muradian et al., 2010; Pirard, 2012). MBIs may offer the 100 
possibility to clarify affected actors, handle impacts that cross land-sea borders, increase co-benefits 101 
from different ESs, and prescribe offsite measures for compensation.  102 
In summary, there is a need to gain a better understanding about market features and ES governance 103 
complexity. This should be based on empirical studies about MBIs and related governance. Next, an 104 
analytical framework will be presented to guide further empirical understanding.  105 
2.2 An analytical framework 106 
Against the aforementioned theoretical context, this paper presents an analytical framework. This 107 
draws on existing qualitative studies about MBIs for ESs which use three perspectives: governance, 108 
institutions, and ecological economics (e.g., Boisvert et al., 2013; Chang, 2008; Muradian & Rival, 109 
2012; Schomers & Matzdorf, 2013). These schools of thoughts have suggested four distinctive 110 
governance aspects of MBIs in relation to coastal and marine ESs. This framework enables a 111 
structured method to gain insights into the utilization of MBIs. Table 1 presents the four distinctive 112 
aspects. 113 
Table 1 Four distinctive governance aspects of MBIs concerning coastal and marine ESs 114 
Aspects Specified aspects Examples 
Price Evaluate specific services Attach prices to sea foods and wetland forests 
Evaluate ES-related proxies: 
negative and positive externalities; 
measurable regulatory elements  
Attach prices to pollution and coastal reservation; 
Land/sea uses, developing rights, permits, and credits 
Regulatory 
support 
Assessment rules Assess land/sea uses, impacts and ecological changes 
Rights and duties  Secure property, permits, and sanction of incompliance 
Transaction rules Set allowable trading types, forms, scope and total 
amount, well-defined baselines, and rules on fair 
distribution 
Coordination  Include related actors for voluntary 
participation  




Coordination methods for making 
free choices 
Arrange meetings, negotiations, platforms, and trading 
places 
Information sharing and 
communication  
Understand transaction costs, ES social meanings, and 
agreed measurement and currencies 
Spatial 
consideration  
Implementation at the scale where 
causality occurs  
Make offsite allocation between upstream and 
downstream, and establishment of watershed-based 
authority  
Address site differences and 
specification  
Set zones, boundaries, and types to differentiate 
impacts/prices/trading rules 
2.2.1 Price 115 
Generally, MBIs either rely on ESs directly, or on ES-proxies, partially, in regulatory terms, to realize 116 
commodification. A price could be attached “to different degrees and in different ways…whether for 117 
market exchange or for direct deals between a limited number of stakeholders, or whatever other 118 
purpose” (Pirard, 2012). Social and economic values of services have been incorporated into MBIs, 119 
such as direct fishery losses. Previous studies (e.g. Bräuer et al., 2006; Grafton, 1996; Greiner et al., 120 
2000) have provided a considerable evaluation of ES-related proxies for hard-to-commodify ESs, 121 
including artificial prices for externalities (e.g., upstream pollution), and measurable regulatory 122 
elements (e.g., land use/cover, fishing quotas, and carbon credits). In this context, land/sea uses have 123 
played a critical role, as these are assumed to generate desirable ESs, connect ecological functions, ES 124 
provision, and coastal and marine spatial allocation (Corbera et al., 2009; Schomers & Matzdorf, 125 
2013).  126 
2.2.2 Regulatory support 127 
Regulations support markets for ESs in various ways. Generally, they are an important part of MBIs. 128 
The following three formal regulations normally impose essential preconditions upon which MBIs 129 
should depend: (1) rules for the assessment of uses, ecological changes and impacts are usually 130 
formulated by defining, e.g., measurement units and feasible methods; (2) rights and duties are 131 
required to be clarified (e.g., specify and deliver permits of fishing rights, and guarantee compliance 132 
with agreements); (3) transaction rules are normally specified, such as defining allowable trading 133 
types, forms, scope, total amount, and baselines, and fairly distributing financial resource (Boisvert et 134 
al., 2013; Chang, 2008; Harman & Choy, 2011; Mansfield, 2006). Regulations are prone to cultivate 135 
and provoke a market-oriented environment. Therefore, the frontier between market and regulation 136 
tends to be blurred for MBIs used in ES governance (Lambin et al., 2014), including in the coastal and 137 
marine field.  138 
2.2.3 Coordination 139 
It is essential that coordination be inherent in the related governance of MBIs and, thereby, play an 140 
essential role in dealing with coastal and marine ES externalities and interactions among various 141 
interest groups. Previous studies have noted that MBIs should stimulate voluntary participation of 142 
service providers, users, and intermediary agencies, and, coordination methods should be in place to 143 
enable those actors to make free choices within market interactions (Sarker et al., 2008; Scherr & 144 
Bennett, 2011). Collective meetings, bilateral negotiations, and platforms for learning and trading are 145 
needed to improve effective ES delivery and long-term transactions (Sarker et al., 2008). Information 146 
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sharing and communication are also critical components of coordination to smooth MBIs in terms of 147 
supporting ES measurement and exchange currencies, achieving collectively agreed payments, and 148 
capturing ES ‘‘social meanings’’ that determine economic incentives (Aronson et al., 2011; Boisvert et 149 
al., 2013; Muradian, 2013; Muradian & Rival, 2012). Therefore, coordination is generally considered 150 
crucial for negotiating an equitable and efficient scheme regarding ES allocation to facilitate MBIs.  151 
2.2.4 Spatial consideration 152 
The governance of MBIs for ESs has gradually been featured by spatial consideration on causal issues 153 
(e.g., trade-offs and synergies between ES provision) and site-based specification. First, concerns have 154 
been raised on the implementation scale of MBIs where ES causality occurs (Kemkes et al., 2010). 155 
For example, to deal with offsite externalities, such as the effect of upstream water uses on 156 
downstream uses, Wunder (2015) noted that payments contracts should take a spatial division between 157 
the provision and utilization of ESs into account. Therefore, it is necessary to address the interplay 158 
between ES causality and scales in governance structures; that is, to try to match political boundaries 159 
and jurisdictions with ecological scales (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2013). Second, when some MBIs 160 
are established on the basis of land/sea use changes, place-based conditions are important for 161 
analyzing ES costs and benefits (Chang, 2008; Harman & Choy, 2011). Specific ecological, economic, 162 
and social conditions in situ determine different measurements of ESs and proxies (zones, types, 163 
prices, and impacts), affecting outcomes of MBIs. Taken together, the spatial nature of MBIs 164 
formulates the way in which cross-border and site-specific issues are dealt with.  165 
3. Case study: China  166 
3.1 The development of MBIs for ESs in China 167 
Social and economic development strategies at different historical stages have determined the 168 
characteristics and performance of Chinese environmental governance (Zhang & Zhao, 2007). In the 169 
1970s and early 1980s, China’s environmental protection featured command-and-control methods 170 
under a centrally planned economy. Later, “economic transformation of a market-oriented growth 171 
model and decentralization dynamics” has triggered a change (Carter & Mol, 2013, pp.3). After the 172 
enforcement of the State Environmental Protection Law in 1979, an environmental regulatory system 173 
was formulated with a rapid acceleration of sectoral regulations and standards; starting with marine 174 
environment protection in 1982. A four-tier management system, including national, provincial, 175 
municipal, and county levels, took charge vertically (Carter & Mol, 2013). Meanwhile, simple 176 
economic instruments (e.g., pollution charges) gained popularity, but by no means with a wide range 177 
of influence (Zhang & Zhao, 2007). Since 1992, sustainable development was set down as a basic 178 
national strategy and within which socialist market economy institutions were preliminarily 179 
established (Zhang & Wen, 2008). In this context, MBIs, such as tradable permits of pollution, 180 
subsidies, and environmental fees, have been introduced. 181 
Chinese coastal and marine governance has provided space for market-oriented policy to face 182 
ecological degradation, land-source pollution, biodiversity losses, eutrophication risk, coast erosion 183 
and other challenges (SOA, 2014a; Wang, 2006). Particularly in 2002, the Administration of the Use 184 
of Sea Areas created a critical institutional shift from free use to compensatory use of sea areas. This 185 
change marks a milestone in the move towards a market-oriented governance of coastal and marine 186 
public resources. It required coordination among administrative, legal and economic instruments to 187 
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deal with complex interrelationships of actors (Chen, 2012). Consequently, regulations about, for 188 
example, sea-use permits, trading platform, impact assessment, and sea-use grades, have been 189 
developed to support some market mechanisms (Li, 2006).  190 
3.2 Selected MBIs for analysis 191 
Chinese national coastal and marine policies have increasingly emphasized the development of MBIs. 192 
Generally, two types have thrived that directly affect the allocation and protection of coastal and 193 
marine ESs. The first type is property rights trading for access rights of public resources. A typical 194 
instrument is the Bidding and Auction for Sea Use Rights (BASUR). The instrument is applied within 195 
the inland waters or territorial seas of China. It is a market-type exchange whereby users (e.g., 196 
fishermen and port companies) set a price that they are willing to offer to gain a sea use right, which 197 
allows for an exclusive use of natural resources in certain spatial and temporal scopes. In 2012, the 198 
State Oceanic Administration issued the Notice on the Full Implementation of Market-oriented 199 
Approach to Sell the Use Right of Marine Sand Mining (SOA, 2012). A range of local regulatory 200 
initiatives of trading sea use rights has also been launched within recent years. These aimed to create 201 
incentives of sufficient and efficient sea uses and to increase the value of public marine resources 202 
(ZJOFD, 2013). These efforts have created a market in China that restricts the use of marine ESs and 203 
increases competition and scarcity of access rights to, for instance, marine sand resources, fisheries, 204 
and coastal space for engineering construction. 205 
The second type of MBI to have thrived in China is payments for ESs. This aimed to motivate actors 206 
to preserve ESs at low costs through different payment mechanisms. According to the classification 207 
developed by Raes et al. (2016), commonly-used mechanisms in China have included compulsory 208 
payments imposed on private sectors and the internal determination of government payments. 209 
Accordingly, the Charges for Marine Ecological Damage Compensation (CMEDC) and the Subsidies 210 
for Fishery Restoration (SFR) accurately represent the two mechanisms, respectively. CMEDC 211 
requires sea users to pay for ecological damage (e.g., pollution, wetland damage, and species loss) 212 
caused by their activities to compensate the loss of benefit incurred by aquaculture farmers and/or 213 
coastal communities. It attempts to address negative externalities by defining a liability and increasing 214 
the costs to consumers. SFR is a hierarchical payment from the government to the private sector for 215 
carrying out habitat restoration, establishing artificial fish reefs, and boosting fish population. Its focus 216 
is on internalizing positive externalities by encouraging a sustainable provision of fishery to meet 217 
seafood demands. The two instruments have been developed through national policies, such as the 218 
Measures for the State’s Loss of Marine Ecological Damage, and the Implementation Guidance on the 219 
Protection of Fishery Resources and Job Transfer Project. These policies have been refined in terms of 220 
local regulations and implemented in coastal governance practice. 221 
The development of the two types of MBIs remains an ongoing process and their related governance 222 
shows clear presence of regulatory and market elements. Thus, it is interesting to investigate the 223 
current state of these policy instruments and to analyze the extent to which existing coastal and marine 224 
governance facilitate these instruments from the four distinctive governance aspects of MBIs. BASUR 225 
is used as an example to explore governance of the first type of MBIs. CMEDC and SFR are analyzed 226 
in a bundle as examples to understand the governance of the second type of MBIs.  227 
4. Research Strategy for analyzing MBIs in China 228 
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This study used a combination of two methods: namely content analysis and semi-structured 229 
interviews. To begin with, existing national policy documents and local pilots on coastal and marine 230 
governance and the two types of MBIs were collected. The national policy documents included 231 
legislations, administrative regulations, statements, program reports, technical guidelines, and 232 
standards (Appendix A). These documents were collected between May and September 2015 from 233 
key official websites, such as the Central Government, the State Oceanic Administration, and the 234 
Ministry of Agriculture. Data about local pilots and initiatives were derived from newspapers and 235 
provincial and municipal government websites to reveal more operational details on each MBI. For 236 
instance, the administrative measures on marine compensation in Shandong province, the bidding for 237 
sustaining marine sand resources in Guangdong province, as well as the implementation of fishery 238 
subsides in Qingdao city.  239 
Next, we interviewed ten key stakeholders to gain insights into the thinking behind the design and 240 
application of each selected MBI in practice. They were either selected according to their position in 241 
the relevant government agencies or their expertise regarding coastal and marine governance 242 
(Appendix B) and whether they were capable of reflecting on the processes, outcomes, developing 243 
trends, and suggestions on the MBIs for ESs. Semi-structured interviews guided questions following 244 
the analytical framework in Section 2.2. 245 
Finally, both the policy documents and the interview transcripts were analyzed with the computer 246 
program of Atlas.ti for content analysis. Table 1 was adopted as a preliminary coding scheme to code 247 
all relevant text passages fitting under each distinctive governance aspect. Those text passages were 248 
aggregated and interpreted accordingly. This led to an in-depth understanding of the empirical 249 
implementation of the studied MBIs.  250 
5. Results: MBIs for ESs in Chinese coastal and marine governance 251 
After analyzing the data from the case, we summarized the key findings in Table 2. The results are 252 




Table 2 Findings on the four distinctive governance aspects of the selected MBIs used in Chinese coastal and marine governance 255 
MBIs BASUR CMEDC & SFR 
Price   
Evaluate specific 
services 
 Losses of natural fisheries and water purification service (CMEDC) 




Sea use rights (inputs for activities or measureable benefits gained 
from ESs) 
Input for ecological conservation and restoration  




Assessment rules Conduct assessment on potential environmental impacts 
Analyze function and location rationality 
Evaluate standard price of different sea areas 
Integrate compensation in environmental impact assessment  
Assess direct input and measurable output from ESs as a basic value 
Assess losses of marine ESs as a theoretical reference for upper limit value 
Rights and duties The State owns the property rights of sea areas 
Adopt a registration and certificate system for uses 
The State determines ES supply and maximum tenures of rights 
 
Sanction of noncompliance of both users and government 
agencies 
The State owns the property rights of sea areas 
Integrate compensation liability with sea use rights (CMEDC)  
Require collective government finance to stimulate private incentives 
against common property setting (SFR) 
Administrative sanctions of noncompliance for government agencies 
Transaction rules Local specification on transaction methods and processes 
Set allowable transaction for certain use objectives and patterns 
Determine national qualification thresholds  
Require collective allocation of payments 
Set allowable method and period of compensation, and facilitate an agreed 
amount of payments (CMEDC) 
Governments’ internal determination of budget amount and project-based 
allocation (SFR) 
Coordination   
Include related 
actors for voluntary 
Users are free to participate but remain rather hierarchically 
affected 




participation Marine administrative agencies act as both providers and 
‘management intermediaries’ with the cooperation among other 
related government agencies 
A few third parties exist to organize trading platforms  
Assessment agencies are involved as ‘assessment intermediaries’ 
Marine administrative agencies act as both ‘intermediary providers’ and 
‘management intermediaries’ (CMEDC) 
Service providers are voluntary to participate (SFR) 
Marine administrative agencies play roles of ‘intermediary users’ and 
‘management intermediaries’ to assign budgets; beneficiaries do not 
participate directly (SFR) 
Limited non-governmental organizations are inclusive 
Assessment agencies are involved as ‘assessment intermediaries’ 
Coordination 




Official documentation and joint meetings 
Negotiation on compensatory prices (CMEDC) 
Less bargaining space for providers in setting top-down payments (SFR) 
Official documentation and joint meetings 
Information sharing 
and communication 
Transparent information on traded areas 
Explicit transaction costs 
Unclear socially optimal prices 
Transparent information on ecological losses, impact scope, extent, and 
mitigation measures (CMEDC) 
Limited understanding of social perceptions of ESs (SFR) 




Implement at the 
scale at which 
causality occurs 
Draw on administrative scales and functional zones 
 
Accord with administrative boundaries  




Consider place-based geographical, ecological, social, and 
economic differences to set starting prices 





5.1 BASUR 257 
5.1.1 Price 258 
Making sea use rights tradable has been increasingly adopted in China. In 2012, the State Oceanic 259 
Administration issued a policy on fully promoting the instrument of BASUR for marine sand mining 260 
(SOA, 2012). Subsequently, such market-type exchange of rights has been expanded to coastal 261 
aquaculture, reclamation, and engineering construction. The focus of BASUR is on sea uses that are 262 
expected to provide ESs; thereby prices are tied to the proxy. As a planner from the National Oceanic 263 
Technology Center explained: “It is a trade of usufruct rights to natural resources. The value of natural 264 
resources is considerably illustrated by how to produce value, namely, utilization, which finally leads 265 
to sea use rights.” To illustrate the value, payments are usually made in two ways: by attaching prices 266 
to inputs for activities (e.g. infrastructures, environmental costs, and administrative costs); and by 267 
evaluating the measureable benefits from ESs, such as aquaculture output and tourism incomes (SOA, 268 
2013a).  269 
5.1.2 Regulatory support 270 
What guarantees an equitable, open, and standardized market for sea use rights is the regulatory 271 
element as that defines assessment, liability, and transaction processes. First, formal assessment is a 272 
precondition for delivering sea use rights. This includes assessing potential environmental impacts 273 
induced by coastal uses, discussing rationality of function and location, and evaluating standard price 274 
of different sea areas (CNSC, 2014; SOA, 2010). Sea assessment and standard prices are emphasized 275 
by the State to maintain elementary values of public natural resources and to avoid a dramatic shift in 276 
price (SOA, 2013a). This emphasis has been refined locally through a formulation of starting prices 277 
and evaluation schemes for bidding in, for instance, the provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian 278 
(SOA, 2008). However, the assessment illustrates less flexibility in performance. As an expert from 279 
the Ocean University of China noted: “Standard price should be dynamic…Current evaluation hardly 280 
captures market changes that may take place rapidly or slowly under the influence of society, 281 
economy, and natural conditions.”  282 
Second, BASUR has followed a set of predefined rules on property rights and duties. Access rights to 283 
natural resources are constrained by a registration and certificate system of sea use rights and zoning 284 
(SOA, 2006). According to ecological and social conditions per zone, governments have determined 285 
the supply of ESs, as well as who has access rights (i.e. issue a certificate as the only legitimate 286 
symbol) and for how long (i.e. set a maximum tenure of right for different uses). Such property 287 
settings have created political pressures on exchanges. One example is short tenures of rights gained 288 
by users. As a planner from the National Oceanic Technology Center explained:  289 
“Governments are not willing to transfer a long-period use right to a risky or large-scaled production like 290 
fish farming. Rapid economic development normally leads to revoking rights for certain areas for new 291 
economic development. It means the longer tenure possessed by a user, the more costs for compensation 292 
governments have to bear.”  293 
BASUR is also conditioned by sanctions for noncompliance of both users and government agencies. 294 
Users who cheat in transactions and change the approved utilization should be fined; government 295 
agencies that fail to conduct supervision should accept penalties (QDHDG, 2015).  296 
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Finally, the regulatory operation of transactions is central to BASUR. Although there is no national 297 
policy that specifies methods or processes for BASUR, local initiatives have brought this aspect 298 
forward, such as in Gunagxi, Guangdong, and Zhejing provinces (ZJOFD, 2013; Zhao et al., 2015). 299 
To assure trading efficiency and justice transparency regarding process, results, and information has 300 
been underlined. Allowable transactions for certain use objectives and patterns have also been set 301 
locally to clarify the scope of tradable objects (QDHDG, 2015). At the national level, thresholds have 302 
been qualified on, e.g., spatial resources for reclamation and maintenance of natural coastal lines 303 
(SOA, 2011). This creates a scarcity for certain uses of the sea in markets. Incomes from bidding and 304 
auction are required to be collectively allocated for ecological restoration and climate risk prevention 305 
as a way of fair distribution.  306 
5.1.3 Coordination  307 
The coordination underpinning BASUR is based on users’ voluntary participation, diverse 308 
coordinative methods, and information communication. First, users (e.g., individuals, firms, entities) 309 
have free and informed choices about how to engage in a bid or an auction. Although users’ 310 
participation is not legally compulsory, users are prone to enter only when a stable relationship with 311 
governments has been developed. This would smooth the subsequent administrative process and 312 
prevents users from undesirable costs. This hierarchical effect is relevant to marine administrative 313 
agencies. These perform as the State’s representatives to provide ESs and approve sea use certificate, 314 
as well as ‘management intermediaries’ for BASUR operation (ZJOFD, 2013). Other related 315 
government agencies are obliged to cooperate with marine sectors. In some local cases, the 316 
operational role can be done by a third party of organizing trading platforms. These can act 317 
independently and without administrative interference (Zhao et al., 2015). BASUR also involves 318 
‘assessment intermediaries’, since the evaluation of sea uses is quite essential for exchange. 319 
Nevertheless, not only marine assessment agencies, but also those from assessment fields of real 320 
estate, forest, and land uses, are active to participate. Several interviewees argued that, although 321 
experiences have been accumulated, schemes (e.g., a socially organized institute and rules on 322 
overcoming assessment rents) are absent to assure the capacity of assessment and the quality of 323 
results. 324 
Second, an array of methods acts to provide bridges to support actors’ cooperation. Trading centers for 325 
sea use rights have been established in cities of Nantong, Qingdao, and Lianyungang to connect 326 
supply and demand sides (Li & Liang, 2014; QDHDGO, 2015). Governments (providers) and bidding 327 
winners are coordinated through contractual agreements; this method actually formulates conditional 328 
payments for gaining a legal certificate of access right. Contracts between assessment agencies and 329 
providers or users are different, as they focus on the exchange of technical services, rather than 330 
ES-related proxies. Cooperation among government agencies for intermediation depends on official 331 
documentation and joint meetings. This allows for discussions about spatial allocation, impacts, and 332 
solutions (ZJOFD, 2013). Civil society is also involved through public notices about trading plans and 333 
results. People who are potentially affected could inform of their own concerns for ESs. 334 
Information presented in BASUR is partly transparent. Information on traded areas relevant to 335 
location, ecosystem quantity, and starting prices is transparent. Transaction costs associated with an 336 
exchange (e.g., price evaluation, negations among intermediaries, and certification enforcement) seem 337 
clear and helpful to reduce information asymmetries. Generally, socially optimal prices of sea use 338 
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rights have not been identified via transaction processes. As an official from the SOA stated: “A 339 
sea-use project is inclusive of military, transportation and private business information…its openness 340 
cannot be determined by one agency. Outcome of openness is uncertain. No one would like to take a 341 
risk.” The poor information sharing causes a weak perception of tradable rights on sea uses. This 342 
further hinders exchange scales, sufficient frequency of transactions, and the identification of optimal 343 
prices. 344 
5.1.4 Spatial consideration 345 
Governance of BASUR demonstrates spatial features in terms of matching administrative scales and 346 
functional zones, and taking in situ differences into consideration for starting prices. BASUR takes 347 
place within administrative scales since the use rights are administratively secured. Moreover, use 348 
purposes of traded areas are required to be consistent with marine functional zones, which define, as 349 
an expert from the Ocean University of China explained, “different attributes of marine resources 350 
particularly in territorial water and for which purpose those natural resources can be used.” This 351 
consideration guarantees that activities decided through biddings/auctions are appropriate for a given 352 
spatial area. Also, these ecological attributes, together with geographical, social, and economic 353 
differences, are critical for designing starting prices (SOA, 2013a). Specifically, national delimitation 354 
of sea-use grades and patterns distinguishes place-based values and ecological costs, serving as an 355 
essential foundation for setting starting prices. 356 
5.2 CMEDC & SFR 357 
5.2.1 Price 358 
CMEDC and SFR are the current mainstream of payments for ESs in Chinese coastal and marine 359 
governance. Both payment mechanisms draw on input for ecological restoration (e.g., costs of 360 
infrastructure, monitoring, assessment, and consultation) and the foregone net benefits from ESs (i.e. 361 
opportunity costs). CMEDC brings evaluation forward to specific ESs; namely, prices on losses of 362 
fisheries and water purification service are taken into account (SOA, 2013b). An official from the 363 
National Development and Reform Commission noted that:  364 
“Current focus is on the quantity loss of material objects. Actually, values of other services like regulating 365 
services should be dominant in marine compensation. However, who is willing to believe it and pay? A 366 
middle course is thus evaluating tangible or easily-calculated things.”  367 
In a recent pilot, more intangible services have been measured and adopted in National Marine Nature 368 
Reserves. This scheme cultivates regulatory rigidity and rich data, in which higher ES prices are 369 
expected to gain great acceptance. 370 
5.2.2 Regulatory support 371 
As mentioned above, CMEDC is about users’ payments for ecological damage caused by their 372 
activities to compensate providers’ losses. SFR is a hierarchical payment from government to 373 
encourage users’ positive activities for ES provision. These two payment mechanisms determine a 374 
strong reliance on regulations. Assessment on ecological losses and payments has been stimulated by 375 
environmental impact assessment (GB/T19485-2014; SOA, 2010). In 2013, the Technical Guidelines 376 
for Assessment of Marine Ecological Damage (Trial) (SOA, 2013b) specified a baseline for 377 
compensation. The value of damaged ESs, however, is only considered as a theoretical reference for 378 
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upper limit compensation (CCICED, 2008).  379 
State-owned property rights of coastal and marine ESs fundamentally affect the two payment 380 
mechanisms. For SFR, people without property are normally short of incentives for ES restoration and 381 
provision. Private incentives need to be stimulated against the context of common property of public 382 
resources. Hence, collective government finance is required to assure the benefits of people who 383 
contribute to ES maintenance or restoration, for example, fishermen and oceanic pasture operators. 384 
For CMEDC, land/sea developers that gained sea use rights normally consume ESs or damage 385 
ecosystems. Sea use rights are helpful to clarify beneficiaries and their liabilities. Thus, the transaction 386 
of sea use rights is a vehicle to impose charges of compensation. Nevertheless, not all utilizations of 387 
coastal and marine space have been clarified in terms of property and this restricts CMEDC (SC, 388 
2013). Eventually, imposing compensation charges and distributing subsidies are typical government 389 
tasks. These activities are associated with administrative sanctions, which have a presence in local 390 
pilots, for instance, the Measures on Administration of Marine Eco-compensation in Shandong 391 
province (SDFD, 2016).  392 
CMEDC and SFR draw on different transaction rules. Compensation periods and allowable 393 
compensation methods are specified for CMEDC. Both users and government should agree on the 394 
amount of payment. SFR is more in line with hierarchy. It is a top-down way to determine the total 395 
amount of subsidies. The amount varies depending on financial capacities and the value that 396 
governments attach to ecological conservation (MAO, 2013). SFR is more like a technical-economic 397 
intervention; its application depends on government-planned restoration projects. Outcomes of such 398 
projects tend to be easily monitored and measured.  399 
5.2.3 Coordination  400 
The two MBIs demonstrate different coordination. The first concern is about the involved actors. For 401 
CMEDC, users are obligated to pay compensation on the demand side, but are free to choose between 402 
cash payment and offsite restoration of a degraded habitat. The official from the National 403 
Development and Reform Commission explained this compulsory participation as follows: 404 
“Most beneficiaries still think that ecological services are free to use…If charges of compensation are too 405 
high to be accepted by users, it is thus less likely to make a good use of marine resources…Compulsory 406 
rules of payment are the result of game.” 407 
From the supply side, marine administrative agencies act on behalf of the State or fishermen to claim 408 
for compensation (as ‘intermediary providers’ of ESs), and also perform a role of ‘management 409 
intermediaries’ to operate and monitor CMEDC (SOA, 2014b). The planner from the National 410 
Oceanic Technology Center criticized the dual position as follows: “Those agencies are apt to employ 411 
power to control more resources through finance distribution…They have a mandate to immunize 412 
against CMEDC for industrial programs that would greatly enhance economic outputs.” For SFR, 413 
freedom of participation is delegated to providers (e.g. fishermen or contractors of artificial fish reef). 414 
Local governments can be seen as service providers also when they receive the State’s payments for 415 
operating public welfare programs. Marine administrative agencies are ‘intermediary users’ (as 416 
representative of final beneficiaries) to assign a revenue from the demand side and take charge of SFR 417 
operation and supervision (MAO, 2013). In this case, beneficiaries do not participate directly; similar 418 
power-affected distribution, as in CMEDC, also occurs due to the dual position of government 419 
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agencies. For both CMEDC and SFR, non-governmental organizations are not engaged in transactions 420 
to provide finance or intermediation service. Only assessment agencies are inclusive as independent 421 
third parties to serve ecological monitoring, damage assessment, subsidy standard formulation, and 422 
project evaluation. 423 
When focusing on coordination methods, negotiation between users and marine administrative 424 
agencies facilitates an agreed price for CMEDC. By contrast, the top-down payments for SFR allow 425 
for limited bargaining space for ES providers. Coordination mainly takes place between related 426 
government agencies in terms of official documentation and joint meetings for budget distribution. 427 
The planner from the National Oceanic Technology Center criticized this as follows: “Providers 428 
should decide how to use the budget and which ecological project should be launched, since they are 429 
the final beneficiaries. Benefits determined by governments may not satisfy providers’ desire.” This 430 
criticism also reveals an insufficient exchange of information about providers’ perceptions of ESs in 431 
SFR distribution. CMEDC performs better in information sharing to make ecological losses, impact 432 
scope, extent, and compensatory mitigation measures available (SOA, 2013b). Transaction costs seem 433 
clear for both mechanisms, such as revenue arguments within governments, direct negotiation with 434 
users based on assessment, and costs comparison between direct payments and offsite restoration. 435 
5.2.4 Spatial consideration 436 
Spatial consideration is underlined as a foundation for CMEDC and SFR. Ongoing developments of 437 
both instruments draw on administrative boundaries, rather than a geographical scale of the ecosystem. 438 
Critical ESs for each geographical unit have not been identified and classified to take compensation 439 
priority. Local budgets only support restoration projects that take place within local boundaries. 440 
Payment rules formulated locally have no cross-border sanction to address upstream-downstream 441 
compensation (SDFD, 2016). In this case, a higher-level government agency normally takes charge of 442 
coordination, such as proposing solutions to offsite pollution. Moreover, identifying critical ESs for 443 
each geographical unit is still ongoing to support compensation priorities. The National Principle 444 
Function Zoning (SC, 2015) and the Marine Functional Zoning have built a spatial framework and 445 
laid a foundation for the identification (SOA, 2009). A specific marine ecological zoning has been 446 
planned to fit the scale and pattern of ecosystems better (SOA, 2009).  447 
6. Reflection and Discussion 448 
6.1 Advantages and shortcomings of the Chinese governance of MBIs for ESs 449 
This paper sought to gain insights into the utilization of MBIs in China for governing coastal and 450 
marine ESs using an analytical framework with four distinctive aspects. The results show just how 451 
much governance matters for MBIs. Not all of the four aspects are part of the Chinese coastal and 452 
marine policy. The results have illustrated certain advantages of Chinese practice. For example: the 453 
existing governance of MBIs is capable of reducing transaction costs, maintaining natural capital, 454 
stimulating actors’ interactions, and integrating place-based features and ES bundles. Meanwhile, 455 
shortcomings of Chinese coastal and marine governance are also revealed, including the exclusion of 456 
major ES values from price setting, inflexible assessment rules, political pressures on market 457 
coordination, and the administrative scales at which MBIs are operated. In the remainder of this 458 
section, the advantages and shortcomings for each distinctive aspect will be discussed.  459 
In China, prices are significantly attached to land/sea uses and inputs, rather than to clearly-defined 460 
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ESs. This consideration makes evaluation easier and less costly for trading. This advantage has been 461 
widely supported in previous studies (Wunder, 2015). Besides, stakeholders’ willingness to pay for 462 
natural resources remains quite weak in China. Given this situation, emphasizing tangible inputs (e.g., 463 
infrastructures) in sea areas is helpful to identify users and increase their participation; and even 464 
promote compulsory participation. This merit has been illustrated by CMEDC and accords with other 465 
empirical research (Farley & Constanza, 2010). By contrast, the evaluation scope of specific services 466 
is quite narrow for the selected MBIs (only includes natural fisheries provision and water purification 467 
service). Excluding the major values of other ESs in price setting may reduce the environmental 468 
effectiveness of the instruments.  469 
Regulations provide a considerable support for the analyzed MBIs in China. First, assessment rules 470 
are helpful to maintain natural capital. Setting standard prices (e.g., the starting price of bidding and 471 
the basic price for compensation) informs stakeholders of basic values of natural capital. It guarantees 472 
a threshold to maintain coastal and marine values in exchanges. Also, the flat-rate prices show 473 
strength in reducing costs that occur in small-scaled transactions (e.g., an exchange of sea use right for 474 
aquaculture). It can lighten the burden that poor users have to bear. Second, property rules and 475 
liability rules (Raes et al., 2016) in China are useful in overcoming free riding and lower transaction 476 
costs. Given the non-excludable attribute of many coastal and marine ESs, access rights to resources 477 
are limited through certificates, or a liability of protection defined by law. Government payments 478 
(SFR) and compulsory charges (CMEDC) are accordingly set. The results reveal the necessity of 479 
hierarchal efforts for ES-related market as many scholars have argued (Kemkes et al., 2010; Wunder, 480 
2015). Meanwhile, hierarchical shortcomings also exist for transactions. For instance, inflexible 481 
assessment rules fail to capture market dynamics, and administrative approval of property can easily 482 
cause political pressures on trading.  483 
In China, coordination for implementing MBIs has grown in importance. The use of coordination 484 
methods, the provision of incentives, and a certain level of freedom to make choices are useful to help 485 
reduce transaction costs. The developed trading platforms, joint meetings, and negotiations enable 486 
actors to join market interactions directly. Different degrees of incentives are offered to stimulate 487 
voluntary participation of ES users (in BASUR) and providers (in SFR). These actors’ engagement is 488 
crucial to reach agreements and reduce costs (Raes et al., 2016; Tacconi, 2012). Chinese government 489 
has an outstanding position in coordination. Government plays the roles of ‘management 490 
intermediaries’ and acts as the representative of users and providers by creating links among actors. 491 
Such monopsony situation (i.e., pooling services from providers or funds from users) and the 492 
intermediary role can decrease transaction costs by minimizing the number of involved actors (Raes et 493 
al., 2016; Vatn, 2015). Nevertheless, those settings do not fully create a favorable environment for 494 
actors to have free meetings, form open-market prices, or increase largely voluntary participation. In 495 
some cases, users’ participation in a bid depends on their relationships with governments. Essentially, 496 
the multiple roles played by government are likely to create political pressures on MBIs. This is most 497 
obvious in the finance allocation that is subject to power. 498 
Regarding the spatial aspect, the two types of MBIs have integrated place-based features and ES 499 
bundles based on spatial zones. Setting starting prices of bids and identifying compensation priorities 500 
considerably rely on the ecosystem functions and attributes of each zone. The assessment of sea areas 501 
and ecological losses in China illustrates a thinking of assessing ES bundles, since an array of ESs is 502 
spatially linked through a certain ecosystem function. Paying for a set of such loosely defined ESs 503 
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may maximize social benefits (Farley & Costanza, 2010). Additionally, bundling ESs in MBIs may 504 
increase beneficiaries and avoid exclusivity on other services caused by commoditizing a certain 505 
service (Kemkes et al., 2010). However, the implementation of the selected MBIs is at administrative 506 
scales that express little concern for the scale at which ES causality occurs. Findings show that no 507 
specific administrative scale matches upstream-downstream allocation or watershed-based causalities. 508 
Existing rules to address those ecological causalities are rather a hierarchical way to realize 509 
administrative coordination. 510 
Overall, as the majority of coastal and marine ESs are common pool or public resources, and as their 511 
property rights belong to the State, Chinese governments promote MBIs in their own way – with 512 
strong reliance on hierarchical support and their past strengths to provide economic incentives. 513 
Consequently, the use of MBIs in Chinese coastal and marine governance only shows part of the four 514 
distinctive governance aspects of MBIs. Based on the above analysis, governance improvements 515 
could be made for a better use of the analyzed MBIs in China. 516 
6.2 Efforts for improvement 517 
To improve the implementation of the analyzed MBIs, three important governance efforts could be 518 
made. First, the major value of coastal and marine ESs should be integrated. A comprehensive 519 
assessment system that defines which, and how to identify and evaluate, critical ESs is needed. To 520 
keep a lower level of transaction costs, such an assessment system could be refined step-by-step based 521 
on existing databases and tools (Primmer & Furman, 2012). Moreover, to reveal optimal prices of ESs 522 
in a dynamic market and inform assessment settings, the frequency of transactions should be 523 
increased. This requires broadening the scope of tradable ES-related proxies and imposing explicit 524 
property rules.  525 
Enhancing social learning and recognition for the payments for coastal and marine resources is also 526 
worthwhile. Creating better partnership atmosphere and communicating channels to share social, 527 
economic, and ecological information can be recommended so that more awareness and support can 528 
be built for MBIs (Chobotová, 2013). Through this, compulsory participation may gradually convert 529 
into voluntary participation with more willingness of payments. This would increase the 530 
environmental effectiveness and socio-economic efficiency of MBIs (Tacconi, 2012).  531 
Last but not least, social and local initiatives on MBIs for ESs should be stimulated to supplement the 532 
hybrid governance in which hierarchy retains a major role. More independent third parties should be 533 
involved and assigned responsibility for operating ES transactions to mitigate political pressures on 534 
markets. Social initiatives on conservation funding need encouragement to change the dominant 535 
position of government funding and improve financial sustainability (Scherr & Bennett, 2011). Local 536 
initiatives on cooperation also require more attention, since they have potentials to bridge across 537 
authorities and overcome sector-by-sector shortages when addressing place-based issues.  538 
7. Conclusion 539 
Previous studies on MBIs for ESs and coastal and marine governance have suggested that the 540 
governance of MBIs should integrate ES values by setting prices to ESs or related proxies, as well as 541 
draw on required regulation as an important support. These studies also point to a better coordination 542 
to enable actors to make free choices based on spatial scales at which coastal ES causality occurs. 543 
However, results from the analyses of Chinese practice show different emphases when compared to 544 
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the general literature about the governance of MBIs for coastal and marine ESs. Chinese policies 545 
largely do not depend on market-oriented ways to determine ES provision, set economic price, or 546 
facilitate free negotiations between supply and demand sides for ES exchange. The understanding of 547 
the role of free choice, and the way in which coastal and marine policies deal with complex ES 548 
interactions, is still limited. By contrast, Chinese MBIs mainly provide economic incentives for ES 549 
maintenance by relying on regulations. The MBIs tend to integrate a certain level of ES valuation and 550 
impact assessment. This contributes to a better understanding of transactions and ES allocations. 551 
Moreover, Chinese coastal and marine governance has a clear focus on improving policy coordination 552 
by reducing transaction costs in a largely non-market environment. 553 
Overall, the analytical framework that emphasizes the four distinctive governance features of MBIs 554 
for ESs; namely price, regulatory support, coordination, and spatial consideration, has proven to be 555 
useful to gain insights into the utilization of MBIs for the governance of coastal and marine ESs. The 556 
empirical analysis of, and the general implications for, Chinese practice contribute to the ongoing 557 
discussions about the need to understand MBIs and ES governance complexity better.  558 
